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INTRODUCTION

T

he best legal mechanism to protect the environment remains a complex and contentious issue. Many normative
questions with practical implications remain. Should the legal
response be in the foundational document of most legal systems,
the Constitution? If so, should a Constitution create a specific
right to environmental protection, or are statutory responses to
address environmental problems adequate?1 If one considers environmental protection globally, both constitutional and legislative responses to environmental protection prevail. Yet, neither
alone is adequate. Environmental legislation may not cater to
individual rights, especially when legislated from a utilitarian
platform. A constitutional right to environmental protection can
protect individuals from environmental harm, but does not necessarily correlate to better or stronger environmental protection.
Consider the examples of the United States and India.
The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly provide a right to environmental protection, nor has the judiciary recognized a right
to environmental protection. Environmental protection is driven
1. See Ernst Brandl & Hartwin Bungert, Constitutional Entrenchment of
Environmental Protection: A Comparative Analysis of Experiences Abroad, 16
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1992) (collecting cases that have rejected the argument
that there is a constitutional right to environmental protection in the United
States.); THOMAS MORE HOBAN & RICHARD OLIVER BROOKS, GREEN JUSTICE 49
(2d ed. 1996).
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by congressional legislation, under the Commerce Clause. The
executive branch enforces appropriate legislation, as well as any
Presidential Executive Orders. The judiciary enters the field as
an arbiter of disputes relating to legislative and executive action.2 While the judiciary also plays a predominant role through
tort law, those cases do not create a specific right to environmental protection, but only provide limited remedy, to the extent an
environmental harm can be redressed under existing tort law
doctrines.3 Although some state constitutions specifically articulate a right to environmental protection,4 legislative and executive action predominate federal environmental protection.
The Indian Constitution, on the other hand, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to include a right to clean and
healthy environmental conditions.5 The Indian Supreme Court
propped up its position through two interpretative stints. First,
the Indian Supreme Court lowered the standing requirement
under Article 32,6 which enables Indians to invoke a court’s writ
jurisdiction to redress violations of fundamental rights or irrevocable constitutional rights.7 Second, it interpreted the right to
life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution to include a right
to environmental protection.8 In India, legislative and executive
measures are also prevalent, but are generally criticized for lax
2. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323@34 (1981). In this case, Justice Marshall upheld the federal government’s authority to pass the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 under the Commerce Clause, and noted:
“[i]t is established beyond peradventure that 0legislative Acts adjusting the
burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of
constitutionality. . . .’ A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the
Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that
there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and
the asserted ends.” See also Richard B. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 335, 339@40 (1990); William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 1 (1997).
3. For a brief summary on the role of tort law in environmental cases, see
ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ROBERT H. ABRAMS, ROBERT L. GRAHAM, LISA
HEINZERLING, DAVID A. WIRTH AND NOAH D. HALL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY 69@71 (4th ed. 2010).
4. See infra Section II.B.
5. See infra Section III.A.2.
6. INDIA CONST. art. 32.
7. See infra Section III.A.2.
8. See infra Section III.A.2.
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enforcement. Tort remedies, like in the United States, are limited to redressing environmental harms within narrowly defined
tort law doctrines.
The 'uestion then becomes which country’s eSperience makes
the more compelling case: India’s recognition of a constitutional
right to environmental protection or the U.S. legislative approach to protect the environment. Given that environmental
protection laws are more robust in the United States than in India, the answer would seem to be the latter.9 This, however, is
not necessarily the case. The answer instead depends on
whether the objective is only to achieve environmental protection in a utilitarian sense or whether the objective is broader?
maximizing environmental protection to all individuals.
Despite relatively stronger environmental protection laws in
the United States, there remains a distributive problem, as not
all Americans are equal beneficiaries of environmental protection laws. The environmental justice movement in the United
States underscores this issue. Some Americans, primarily because of their race or economic status, bear a disparate burden
of environmental problems and/or enjoy lesser benefits from environmental protection laws.10 To redress the problem, environ-

9. According to the Yale Environmental Performance Index, the United
States is ranked number twenty-six in the world for its environmental performance, with a 3.84 percent improvement over a ten-year period, whereas India
is ranked number 141, with its environmental performance decreasing by 0.52
percent in the past ten years. ANGEL HSU ET AL., 2016 ENVIRONMENTAL
PERFORMANCE INDEX, YALE CTR. FOR ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 18@19 (2016),
http://epi.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2016EPI_Full_Report_opt.pdf. The regional analysis for both countries are different. Id. at 113. Although a country’s
rank in the report does not attribute a better ranking to better environmental
laws, there is a correlation between effective environmental laws and better
environmental conditions, even if regulation alone may not always be the only,
or even the best, means of achieving environmental protection. See, e.g.,
DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 19@20
(7th ed. 2006).
10. Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice
and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001,
1003@04 (1993); Jennifer Wolch, John P. Wilson & Jed Fehrenbach, Parks and
Park Funding in Los Angeles: An Equity-Mapping Analysis, 26 URB.
GEOGRAPHY 4 (2005). See generally CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN, EILEEN GAUNA
& CATHERINE A. O’NEILL, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 35@71 (2d ed. 2009) (collecting articles that document environmental justice problems in the United
States).
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mental justice advocates have framed the issue of disparate environmental protection as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming that states have
denied equal protection of environmental laws to some Americans.11 According to judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, however, a petitioner must prove intentional discrimination to succeed in a Fourteenth Amendment petition.
This standard of proof has not only diminished the ability of environmental justice advocates to get redress from unequal environmental protection under the Equal Protection Clause, but
also under corresponding legislation of Title VI of the Civil
Rights ActO specifically & 6I<O due to the =udiciary’s application
of the intent requirement.12 The American =udiciary’s interpreL
tation has resulted in environmental justice being primarily addressed under broadly worded executive orders that do not provide any private cause of action.13 The current environmental
justice movement in the U.S. demonstrates that robust environmental laws are no substitute for an enforceable right to environmental protection. Then, can the creation or recognition of a
constitutional right to environmental protection resolve this
problem? Not necessarily, as it would depend on the nature of
the right.
Let us consider, again, the example of India. Per judicial interpretation, a right to environmental protection is integral to the
negative right to life. A right to life, however, will not necessarily
address the environmental justice problem or unequal environmental protectionK IndeedO in IndiaO although the =udiciary’s eSL
pansive interpretation has made a healthy environment a constitutional right, not all Indians are able to equally enjoy it. Not
only are there few cases in which the Court has even recognized
a constitutional right to environmental protection, but also,
some of these decisions have an unequal impact. One example is
the case of Almitra Patel and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors,14
where the Indian Supreme Court focused on slum dwellers, to
the exclusion of other residents, in addressing the problem of

11. See infra Section II.B.
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012); Civil Rights Act
of 1964 § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2012).
13. See infra Section II.B.
14. Almitra H. Patel v. Union of India, (1998) 2 SCC 416, http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=13504.
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waste disposal in New Delhi.15 Also, because the right to life in
both the Indian and the U.S. Constitutions is a negative right, it
can be limited by due process of law. Thus, a constitutional right
to environmental protection, as part of a right to life alone, is not
adequate and will not address the environmental injustice problemK ThusO what should be the “right” right to environmental
protection?
The American and Indian experiences, in framing environmental protection as a constitutional right, provide valuable lessons for mapping the critical components of a right to environmental protectionK America’s eSperience with the environmental
justice movement demonstrates that even robust environmental
protection laws may not protect all individual rights equally.
The Indian experience, on the other hand, demonstrates that
failure of the legislative and executive branches can be somewhat counteracted by judicial intervention. It also shows that
symbolic and creative interpretation can promote meaningful
protection of fundamental constitutional rights. Therefore, an
effective right to environmental protection should incorporate
and/or supplement at least the following three rights: 1) the
right to life, 2) the right to equal protection under environmental
laws, and 3) the right to judicial review and access to courts.
While normatively desirable, these rights need not be articulated in the Constitution, as constitutional amendments or expansive interpretation of constitutional provisions could present
practical difficulties. In the United States, any change to the
Constitution would require a constitutional amendment, which,
under Article V,16 requires a supermajority vote of the legislative
branch, making constitutional amendments extremely difficult.17 Given the history of the =udiciary’s interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause, it is unlikely that the U.S. Supreme
Court will interpret it to redress unequal protection under environmental laws, nor is it likely that the U.S. Supreme Court will
recognize a right to healthy environmental protection under the

15. See infra Section III.B.
16. U.S. CONST. art. V.
17. JEB RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 175 (2001) (noting that Article V’s
super-majoritarian vote requirement to amend the Constitution “creates a process very difficult to negotiateK”).
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Fourteenth Amendment. In at least two decisions,18 the U.S. Supreme Court has signaled that constitutional due process protection does not extend to negligent deprivation of rights. Therefore, since environmental justice claims focus on disparate impact, rather than intentional discrimination, it is unlikely that
the U.S. Supreme Court will interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to recognize a constitutional right to equal environmental
protection, absent intentional discrimination. It is equally unlikely that the Indian Supreme Court will frame the right to environmental protection as a matter of equal protection under the
Indian Constitution. Given these challenges to creating or incorporating a constitutional right to environmental protection,
were a country able to strengthen the three core rights that are
central to protecting an individual right to environmental protection without a formal constitutional amendment or judicial
interpretation of existing rights, say by legislative action, then a
pre-occupation with form should not overshadow the substance
of the efforts to realize the right to environmental protection.
Viewed from this lens, it is not so much the existence of a constitutional right to environmental protection, but its impact that
is relevant. Robust environmental protection laws could signal
that a government is effectively performing its function to protect individual rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Then,
the legal manner in which, or the branch of government through
which, the right to environmental protection is guaranteed and
enforced becomes less relevant. Conversely, weak and/or ineffective environmental protection, whether to all citizens at large or
a discrete group of individuals, signals the need to establish
and/or reinforce the right to environmental protection, be it
within the normative frame of a right to life, to equal protection
under law, and/or access to the judiciary by facilitating standing.
So long as it substantially protects critical fundamental individual rights from environmental harmsO the “right” right to enviL
ronmental protection can be reinforced even outside the constitutional text.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I will describe the environmental justice problem in the United States. It will discuss
the problem of disparate environmental impact faced by certain
sections of the American populace and some obstacles to redress
18. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332@34 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon,
474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986).
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the problem under the Equal Protection Clause, particularly in
light of the UKSK Supreme Court’s interpretation of the E'ual
Protection Clause in landmark cases, including Washington v.
Davis19 and Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp.,20 requiring proof of either intentional discrimination or of
a discriminatory purpose in enacting and/or enforcing laws that
have a disparate impact.21 It will then analyze the impact of the
UKSK Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis on subsequent legal challenges brought by environmental justice advocates to unequal protection laws under §§ 601 and 602 of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act. This discussion will demonstrate that,
despite relatively robust environmental laws, unequal environmental protection in the U.S. strains the constitutional right to
equal protection. Part II will then discuss the role of the Indian
judiciary in strengthening access to judicial review and in recognizing a right to environmental protection as part of the right to
life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. It will then explain the conteStual importance of the Indian Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Indian Constitution to promote environmental protection in India, as well as the limits of the Court’s
interpretation in guaranteeing effective and equal environmental protection. This Part will illustrate, through the Indian experience, that a constitutional right to environment, as a concomitant of the right to life, is incomplete and inadequate in securing equal environmental protection. Finally, Part III will propose that an effective right to environmental protection should
reflect, and be informed by, the following three constitutional
rights, which are incorporated in most contemporary constitutions: 1) the right to life, 2) the right to equal protection of the
laws, and 3) the right to judicial review.

19. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). The issue in the case was
whether hiring and promotion policies of the District of Columbia’s police department discriminated against black officers and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
20. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977). Plaintiffs in this case challenged the Village of Arlington Height’s refusal to rezone a land parcel to allow multi-family residence for low and moderate-income housing as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, arguing
that the purpose of the refusal was to discriminate against racial minorities
and not to protect property values, as claimed by the village authorities. Id.
21. Id.
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I. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
The history of modern environmental law in the United States
can be traced back to the 1970s. As environmental problems increased, so did legal intervention. Propelled by a combination of
severe pollution, the resulting adverse health impacts, and a
strong popular resistance, the legislature and executive
branches enacted and enforced a series of environmental protection laws.22 Even as environmental protection laws gained traction, a new problem emerged in the 1980s. Certain groups were
bearing a greater share, an unfair and unjust share, of environmental harm than others. Environmental laws, however, at best
ignored and at worst promoted, this unequal or disparate environmental impact.23 Thus began the environmental justice
movement, despite the significant progress in creating environmental protections laws and administrative mechanisms to mitigate environmental pollution and degradation.
A. Understanding the Environmental Justice Problem
In the United States, the 1980s was a period that witnessed a
robust expansion of the civil rights movement, including Native
American rights, which percolated to the issue of environmental
protection.24 Research revealed that some groups of people had
to endure more environmental pollution than others.25 The Government Accountability Office and the United Church of Christ

22. See generally A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Protection: The Potential
Misfit Between Equity and Efficiency, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 871, 876@80 (1992);
Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of American and the Graying of United
States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three
Decades in the United States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 77@79 (2001).
23. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”:
The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787,
789@90 (1993); Uma Outka, NEPA and Environmental Justice: Integration,
Implementation, and Judicial Review, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 601, 624
(2006).
24. RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 3. LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R.
FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (2001). Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and “Justice,” 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221,
261@64 (1997). [hereinafter Kaswan, Bridging the Gap].
25. RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 3@4; Tseming Yang, Melding
Civil Rights and Environmentalism: Finding Environmental Justice’s Place in
Environmental Regulation, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4@8 (2002).
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Commission for Racial Justice released reports that demonstrated a correlation between exposure to environmental pollution, race, and/or low-income.26 Studies showed that while more
hazardous waste sites were located closer to minority and lowincome communities, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) made fewer efforts to clean up pollution in these communities.27 Subsequent case studies demonstrated that the environmental justice problem persisted, despite legal intervention,28
partially because civil rights were not factored into the environmental law-making process.29 This problem persists.
Environmental injustice in the United States has manifested
in the following ways: siting of hazardous waste facilities, including treatment, storage, and disposal facilities; exposure to
industrial activities and other environmental harms such as pesticides and contaminated fish; toxic release inventory facilities;
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina; and disparate access to environmental benefits such as transportation, public parks and
26. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO-RCED-83-168, SITING OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND
ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983), http://archive.gao.gov/d48t13/121648.pdf; COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES
AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES
(1987), http://uccfiles.com/pdf/ToxicWastes&Race.pdf.
27. RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 36@39.
28. Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities,
Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental
Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775, 826@27 (1998) (discussing the environmental justice problem in Chester County, Pennsylvania.); Thomas Lambert
& Christopher Boerner, Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes, Economic
Solutions, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 195, 213@14 (1997) (documenting environmental
justice problems in St. Louis metropolitan area, but praising legislative efforts
in Wisconsin).
29. Yang, supra note 25; RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 42@43;
Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and
Class as Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV. 921, 931 (1992) (providing statistics establishing disparate environmental impact on certain classes of people.); Robert W. Collin, Review of the Legal
Literature on Environmental Racism, Environmental Equity, and Environmental Justice, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 121, 125@34 (1994). But see Vicki Been &
Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudinal
Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 19@21 (presenting data to show that, in the case of African Americans, the disproportionate
siting of polluting facilities was a result of market dynamics, calling for policy
to be crafted accordingly).

2017]

The "Right" Right to Environmental Protection

85

open spaces, environmental cleanup, and, more recently, safe
drinking water.30 Environmental injustice has been attributed
to several causes, from market dynamics to the legal framework,
including, notably, environmental protection laws.31 Land use
and zoning laws disparately affect minority communities either
by encouraging discriminatory site selection for locally unwanted land use, such as hazardous waste disposal and manufacturing activities, or by affecting urban renewal policies.32
Market dynamics can also affect site selection, from project developers wanting to locate polluting projects in communities
where resistance and costs associated with such resistance is
lowest, to minority communities moving into polluted areas because of lower housing cost.33
Environmental protection laws, although relatively robust and
well-developed, have exacerbated environmental justice problems in several ways. These include, primarily, by failing to provide mechanisms to mitigate discrimination during the decisionmaking process, by excluding minority communities that may be
affected by centralized decision-making, or by concluding bargains that do not take into account disparate effects on minority
communities, be it pollution control laws or siting decisions.34

30. RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 35@71 (collecting published
studies that establish the various ways in which minority and low-income communities suffer from environmental harms). A more recent example is the
drinking water contamination problem in Flint, Michigan. David A. Dana &
Deborah Tuerkheimer, After Flint: Environmental Justice as Equal Protection,
111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 93, 95@96 (2017).
31. Been, supra note 10.
32. RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 73@81; Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning Approach to Environmental Racism,
11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495, 507@16 (1992); Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Planning
Milagros: Environmental Justice and Land Use Regulation, 76 DEN. U. L. REV.
1, 76@85 (1998).
33. Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1387 (1994);
Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75, 81@82
(1996); RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 81@92.
34. Lazarus, supra note 23, at 812@22; Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the
Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19
ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 642@54 (1992); RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 93@
102; Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and
the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 4, 12@14 (1998); Kaswan, Bridging the Gap, supra note 24.
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Racism is also a broader underlying cause that is often attributed to environmental injustice in the United States, resulting in minority communities bearing unfair shares of environmental harm.35 The environmental justice movement in the
United States is a vivid illustration of the inadequacy of elaborate environmental protection laws in delivering to all Americans an equal right to environmental protection. This state of
affairs begs the question whether creating or recognizing a constitutional right to environmental protection can redress the
problemK In considering this 'uestionO Part II will discuss India’s
experience with recognizing a constitutional right to environmental protection.
B. Constitutional Law and Environmental Justice
The relationship between constitutional law and environmental protection in the United States was initially limited to the
question of whether Congress had authority, under the Constitution, to legislate on environmental matters. As the judiciary
has consistently held, Congressional authority to enact environmental protection legislation lies in Article I of the Commerce
Clause, which authorizes Congress to legislate on matters that
affect interstate commerce, including environmental protection.36 The environmental justice movement changed this paradigm by framing environmental protection as a discrimination
problem that triggered the Hourteenth Amendment’s E'ual ProL
tection Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.37

35. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 349 (1987) (arguing that
environmental justice is a result of unconscious racism, which should be considered when interpreting the discriminatory purpose doctrine).
36. For an overarching discussion on environmental regulation, the
dormant Commerce Clause, and its critique, see generally Christine A. Klein,
The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2003). See
also Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1283, 1290@93 (1997).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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The anti-discriminatory language of the Fourteenth Amendment became central to environmental =ustice advocates’ efforts
to seek redress for disparate environmental harm suffered by
certain communities.38 Their central argument was that laws allowing, even facilitating, locally undesirable land use (LULUs)
in certain communities constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the laws were discriminatory.39 Judicial
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, however, has
made efforts to seek redress under the Fourteen Amendment
nearly impossible.
The seminal and paradigm shifting case on the Equal Protection Clause is considered to be Washington v. Davis.40 In this
case, where black police officers challenged a test for promotion,
the Supreme Court held that discriminatory impact alone was
insufficient to establish a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, finding that plaintiffs also had to prove discriminatory
purpose or discriminatory intent.41 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court fleshed out the meaning of discriminatory purpose.
In Vill. of Arlington Heights,42 the Court held that plaintiffs
could establish discriminatory purpose by showing that race had
been “a motivating factor in the decisionK”43 It expounded the following four non-exhaustive factors, in addition to disparate impact, to help determine whether the law had a discriminatory
purpose: 1) historical background to the decision-making process, 2) historical background to the decision, 3) any departure
from normal substantive factors and procedures, and 4) legislative or administrative history.44
The Supreme Court further tightened the definition of discriminatory purpose in 8F('.//F> "H0A/A’( .D K_''_JB%'F&&' $.

38. See generally Alice Kaswan, Environmental Laws: Grist for the Equal
Protection Mill, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 387, 408 (1999) [hereinafter Kaswan, Environmental Laws].
39. Id.
40. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
41. Id. at 242 and 245 (noting, “to the extent those cases rested on or expressed the view that proof of discriminatory racial purpose is unnecessary in
making out an equal protection violation, we are in disagreement.”).
42. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 267@68.

88

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 43:1

Feeney.45 The Court held that the mere fact that the legislature
acted with the intent to pass a challenged legislation, and that
it could have foreseen that as a natural consequence of the law,
a particular class would be disadvantaged, was not adequate
proof of discriminatory purpose.46 Plaintiffs had to prove that a
law was passedO at least in partO “because of” the discriminatory
effect it would have on a particular class and not “in spite of”
such discriminatory effect.47 This is a hard standard to meet, except in certain municipal level cases.48
R.I.S.E. v. Kay illustrates the difficulty in proving intent under
the Feeney standard.49 In R.I.S.E., plaintiffs challenged the decision of King & Queen County, Virginia, to permit construction
of a landfill in an area that hosted several other such landfills,
on the ground that the decision impacted black communities disparately, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.50 Although
sympathetic to the plaintiffs claim, the court held that plaintiffs
had failed to meet the legal requirement for establishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment?proof of discriminatory
intent or discriminatory purpose.51 The court agreed that “the
historical placement of landfills in predominantly black communities was 0an important starting point’” to show discriminatory
intent.52 The court held, however, that evidence of the administrative steps taken by the county revealed “nothing unusual or
suspiciousO” and only reflected efforts by the County’s Board of

45. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). The plaintiff
challenged a Massachusetts law that gave veterans employment preferences,
claiming that the law naturally worked against women and thus violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
46. Id. at 278@79.
47. Id. at 279.
48. RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 481. E.g., Ammons v. Dade
City, 783 F.2d 982, 988 (11th Cir. 1986); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d
1181 (11th Cir. 1983); Swati Prakash, Racial Dimensions of Property Value
Protection under the Fair Housing Act, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1437, 1475@80 (2013)
(discussing the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s application.); Kaswan,
Environmental Law, supra note 38, n. 96. See generally Edward Patrick Boyle,
Note, It’s Not Easy Bein’ Green: The Psychology of Racism, Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46
VAND. L. REV. 937, 963@65 (1993).
49. See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991).
50. Id. at 1147@48.
51. Id. at 1149@50.
52. Id. at 1149.
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Supervisors to balance “the economicO environmentalO and culL
tural needs of the County in a responsible and conscientious
mannerK”53 It also noted that the Equal Protection Clause did not
“impose an affirmative duty to equalize the impact of official decisions on different racial groups. Rather, it merely prohibit[ed]
government officials from intentionally discriminating on the
basis of raceK”54 The court held that plaintiffs failed to establish
intentional or purposeful discrimination.55
Encumbered by the difficult standard of proof required to successfully establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, environmental justice advocates began pursuing an alternative
venue?§§ 601 and 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.56 Section 601 prohibits discriminatory practices in programs that receive federal funding.57 Section 602 authorizes federal government agencies to enforce § 601.58 Although Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act does not explicitly provide for a private remedy, the
judiciary has interpreted Title VI to allow a private remedy.59 As
discussed below, environmental justice advocates have brought
environmental justice claims under both provisions. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the E'ual Protection ClauseO
however, has also shadowed remedies under §§ 601 and 602
claims. A plaintiff bringing a claim under § 601 must establish
53. Id. at 1150.
54. Id. at 1150 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 1150.
56. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 601, 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, § 2000d-1 (2012).
57. According to § 601, “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.” Id.
58. Section 602 reads in part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to
extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of
insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 601 with respect to such program
or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general
applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of
the objectives of the statute authorizing financial assistance
in connection with which the action is taken.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d, § 2000d-1 (2012).
59. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 667, 694@99 (1979); Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 294@95 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

90

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 43:1

discriminatory intent or discriminatory purpose, as governed by
Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights.60 As with Equal
Protection Clause cases, statistics of racial composition and
other circumstantial evidence could demonstrate facially evident disparate impact,61 but could not prove discriminatory intent or purpose.
The decision in Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp.,62 is illustrative
of the difficulty in proving intent. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary
injunction against the construction of a Type I solid waste facility permitted by the Texas Department of Health, on the ground
that it discriminated against a minority population.63 After considering the statistical data presented, the court concluded that
the permit did not establish a pattern of discrimination in placing waste sites in certain neighborhoods, especially because the
statistics for initial permits for other waste sites showed that?
46.2 to 50 percent of the waste sites were located in census tracts
“with less than WaV :7* minority population at the time they
openedK”64 The court also decided that later permitting statistics
did not prove discriminatory purpose, as a comparable number
of solid waste sites were located in Anglo neighborhoods and because the decision to locate some facilities close to the Houston
shipping channel appeared to be motivated by efficiency considerations rather than by an intent to discriminate.65 The Bean
decision demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s reading of disL
criminatory intent or discriminatory purpose into the Equal Protection Clause has percolated to § 601 as well.
Remedies under § 602 present a separate challenge for plaintiffs with respect to standing. Section 602 authorizes federal
agencies to pass regulations to enforce § 601.66 Pursuant to §
602, the EPA has passed regulations prohibiting disparate impact in environmental decision-making.67 Plaintiffs invoking the

60. See generally Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
61. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d
446, 491 (D.N.J. 2001).
62. Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
63. Id. at 675.
64. Id. at 677 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 680@81.
66. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2012).
67. Part of the EPA regulation effectuating § 601 reads: “[a] recipient [of
federal funding] shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program
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EPA regulation do not have to prove discriminatory intent or
discriminatory purpose, because the regulatory language covers
discriminatory effects.68 Hollowing the Supreme Court’s decision
in Alexander v. Sandoval69 and its application in South Camden
!A&AYF/' A/ "J&A./ $. NF] JF('FZ bF+’& .D P/$&>. 8(.&.,70 however,
environmental justice advocates cannot challenge actions that
have disparate impact under EPA regulations or other disparate
impact regulations passed under § 602, as discussed below.
In Alexander v. Sandoval, petitioner, a representative in a
class-action lawsuit, challenged an Alabama Public Safety Department’s decision to administer state driver’s license eSams in
English only, claiming that it violated the Department of Justice’s anti-discriminatory regulation passed under § 602, proscribing discriminatory impact.71 The Supreme Court addressed
whether a Title VI regulation that prohibited disparate impact
could create a private right of action for acts violating the regulation.72 The majority held that § 602 regulations did not create
a private cause of action, reasoning that such a reading would
confer a right to sue for disparate impact under Title VI, contrary to Supreme Court decisions holding that, in order to receive a remedy under Title VI, a plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent or discriminatory purpose.73 The Court also noted
that allowing a private right of action under a § 602 disparate
impact regulation, which essentially gives effect to § 601, would
prohibit acts that were permissible under § 601?(i.e., acts that
have disparate impact.)74 A private action under a § 602 disparate impact regulation could only be sustained by the “independL
ent force of & 6I:K”75 The Supreme Court held that Congress had
not intended to create an independent private cause of action
under § 602 because, unlike § 601, the Court observed that § 602
had no “rights-creating” languageO but merely addressed federal

which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of
their race.” 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2016).
68. Id.
69. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285 (2001).
70. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Dep’t. Envtl. Prot., 145 F.
Supp. 2d 446, (D.N.J. 2001).
71. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 278@79.
72. Id. at 279.
73. Id. at 285@91.
74. Id. at 281@82.
75. Id. at 275@81.
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agencies granting funds.76 It reiterated that Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action under Title VI, absent
intentional discrimination. The Court, however, noted in dicta
that regulations passed under § 602 were valid, even if they proscribed actions that had disparate impact, which were permitted
under § 601.77 The Supreme Court’s decision in Sandoval impacted the decision in South Camden,78 an environmental injustice case.
In South Camden, environmental justice plaintiffs challenged
a permit issued by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) to a cement company.79 Plaintiffs
claimed that the NJDEP’s decision to permit the cement plant
in a neighborhood that was within a non-attainment zone under
the Clean Air Act, and which housed 91 percent colored residents with a disproportionately high incidence of asthma, disparately impacted a minority community, in violation of the EPA
regulations under § 602.80 Defendant NJDEP argued that because it had complied with the Clean Air Act and relevant provisions, there was no violation of EPA regulations under § 602.81
The court decided on the discriminatory impact claim, as well as
whether § 602 created a private right to sue.82 The court found
for the environmental justice plaintiffs on both counts, ruling
that the NJDEP had failed to consider discriminatory effect during the permitting process.83 It also noted that there was an implied private cause of action under § 602.84 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sandoval, however, the District Court
modified the decision in South Camden to conform to the Supreme Court’s decisionK85 The District Court reversed its order

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 276@77.
Id. at 281@83.
S. Camden Citizens in Action, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 505.
Id. at 450@52.
Id. at 451, 453@70.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 472@73.
Id. at 501@02.
Id. at 473.
See id. at 508@10.
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granting injunctive relief under § 602. Instead, it granted injunctive relief under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,86 per Justice Steven’s dissenting opinionK87 The Third Circuit, however, reversed
the decision to grant injunctive relief,88 and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari on appeal.89
In rejecting the enforceability of a § 602 disparate impact regulation under § 1983, the Third Circuit in South Camden held
that the “EPA’s disparate impact regulations WcouldV not create
a federal right enforceable through &<349O” since it “WcouldV
hardly be argued reasonably that the right alleged to exist in the
EPA’s regulationsO namely to be free of disparate impact discrimL
ination in the administration of programs or activities receiving
EPA assistance, can be located in either section 601 or section
6I: of Title .IK”90 In other words, recognizing the right to enforce
§ 602 disparate impact regulations under § 1983 would indirectly remove the intentional or purposeful discrimination requirement under §§ 601 and 602, contrary to the Supreme
Court’s decisionsK91
As such, the Supreme Court, in other decisions not related to
environmental justice, has held that to enforce a law under §
1983, the law should clearly create a private right of enforcement. For instance, in Blessing v. Freestone,92 a case involving
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, the Supreme Court set out
86. Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). § 1983
provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
other proper proceedings for redress. . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
88. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t. Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771,
788 (3d Cir. 2001).
89. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t. Envtl. Prot., 122 S. Ct. 2621
(2002).
90. S. Camden Citizens in Action, 274 F.3d at 788.
91. Id.
92. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340@41 (1997).
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a three-part test to determine whether a federal statute established a private right of action under § 1983.93 The Court held as
follows:
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right allegedly protected by the statute is not
0so vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain =uL
dicial competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory terms.94

In Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,95 a case relating to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),96 the Supreme Court
held that to create a private right of action, FERPA should have
been “phrased in terms of the persons benefittedK”97 The Court
decided that since HERPA did not have “individually focused
rights-creating languageO” it did not create a private cause of acL
tion.98 These decisions signal that enforcing § 602 regulations
under § 1983 will be difficult.
Given that relief under the Fourteenth Amendment is limited
to intentional discrimination, that remedy under § 601 of Title
VI is limited to intentional discrimination by entities receiving
federal funding, that there is no private right of action under §
602, and that § 1983 can be invoked only if a § 602 disparate
impact regulation also creates a private right of action, environmental =ustice advocates’ ability to achieve a constitutional right
to equal environmental protection in the United States is nearly
foreclosed. The executive branch has filled this void and the issue of environmental justice is now primarily addressed by the
executive branch.
In 1992, the EPA established a department on environmental
justice and launched several initiatives to address the problem
of environmental justice.99 In 1994, President Bill Clinton signed
an ESecutive 2rder on Environmental Eustice Q“EE ESecutive

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Blessing, 520 U.S. 329, at 340.
See generally Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2012 & Supp. 2015).
Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 274.
Id.
Lazarus, supra note 23.
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2rder”P re'uiring all federal agencies to integrate environmenL
tal justice into their decision-making.100 A Presidential Memorandum accompanying the EJ Executive Order also required the
EPA to ensure that programs and activities receiving EPA funding would comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,101
by directing the EPA to ensure that recipients of federal funding
did not directly or indirectly discriminate on the basis of race,
color, or national origin.102 The EPA has since undertaken several initiatives in an effort to incorporate justice concerns into
its decision-making process.103 In 1998, the EPA adopted a
“standard definition” of environmental =ustice as follows:
The fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, incomes, and
educational levels with respect to the development and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair
treatment implies that no population should be forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of exposure to the negative effects
of pollution due to lack of political or economic strength. 104

The EPA’s efforts are in line with broader administrative reL
forms that seek to decentralize the decision-making process and
make it more inclusive.105 Yet, the changes at the administrative
level do not fully address environmental justice problems because, among other reasons, the formula for equitable risk distribution remains elusive.106 As one scholar put it, missing still
is “the identification of a core set of normative goals?including
100. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 859 (1995).
101. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 601, 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, § 2000d-1 (2012).
102. Memorandum from William Clinton, President of the United States,
Memorandum for the Heads of All Departments and Agencies, Subject: Executive Order on Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority
Populations
and
Low-Income
Populations
(Feb.
11,
1994),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-02/documents/clinton_memo_12898.pdf.
103. See generally Environmental Justice, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).
104. Id.
105. Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 459 (2002) (evaluating the changes in decisionmaking processes to accommodate environmental justice concerns).
106. See, e.g., Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of
Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103 (arguing that the quantitative risk assessment procedure in the EPA places a disproportionate burden of environmental pollution on minority communities.); MATTHEW D. ADLER,
WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION (2012).
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procedural and distributional =usticeK K K K”107 That core set of normative goals missing is the right to equal environmental protection. The question is whether a constitutional right to environmental protection, as in the case of India, can remedy the problem of environmental injustice.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE INDIAN
CONSTITUTION
Environmental problems in India are of Himalayan proportions, ranging from ecosystem degradation to pollution and great
vulnerability to climate-change induced disasters, such as
droughts and floods.108 Although the Indian government has
promulgated several environmental protection laws since the
1970s, severe environmental problems persist, as India straddles the dueling interests of economic development and environmental protection.109 Millions of Indians are exposed to injuries
from environmental problems. The general ineffectiveness of environmental statutes in addressing environmental problems in
India has led to judicial challenges through the public interest
litigation (PIL) mechanism, and the judiciary has interpreted
the Article 21 protection of right to life in the Indian Constitution to include environmental protection. The Indian =udiciary’s
jurisprudence on environmental protection has resulted in the
creation of a special statutory environmental tribunal, or the
National Green Tribunal (NGT) under the National Green Tribunal Act (NGTA).110 The Indian Supreme Court’s recognition of
a constitutional right to a healthy environment, however, does
not address the issue of disparate environmental impact, leaving
the right to e'ual protection unarticulatedK India’s eSperiencesO
as discussed below, demonstrate how environmental protection,
as a concomitant of the right to life, is not sufficient.

107. Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, supra note 105, at 498.
108. CTR FOR SCI. AND ENV’T, INDIA’S STATE OF ENVIRONMENT REPORT (2016)
(on file with author).
109. Id.
110. National Green Tribunal Act, No. 19 of 2010, http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/PACT/2010/The%20National%20Green%20Tribunal%20Act,%202010.pdf.
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A. Constitutional Law and Environmental Protection in India
Environmental laws in India are comparable to environmental
laws in the United States, in that there is framework law on environmental law and several issue-specific laws, such as the Air
Pollution Control Act. Indian environmental protection laws,
however, have not provided statutory standing to bring civil actions to enforce individual rights in courts.111 The scope of remedies under tort law are also limited to damages and injunctions,
which do not address environmental problems in a comprehensive manner.112 The Indian Supreme Court’s interpretation of
constitutional provisions on standing to invoke the Court’s writ
jurisdiction and on fundamental rights, however, has created alternative venues for civil remedies.113
1. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Constitutional
Provisions on Standing and Right to Life
Under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, a citizen whose
fundamental constitutional rights have been violated can file a
writ petition before the Indian Supreme Court, or High
Courts.114 Article 9: readsO in partO thatO “Wt]he right to move the
Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for enforcement of
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteedK” Socio-economic
conditions, notably poverty and illiteracy, impeded the full realization of Article 32 by Indians. Not until it was catalyzed by the
press did the =udiciary acknowledge that India’s legal system
had failed to provide =ustice to the “common manK”115 The Indian
judiciary addressed the problem by whittling away some of the
formal re'uirements for invoking the Court’s =urisdictionO notaL
111. SHYAM DIVAN & ARMIN ROSENCRANZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN
INDIA 132@33 (2d ed. 2001). Polluters, now have standing to sue a polluter under § 19 of the Environmental (Protection) Act, 1986, § 49 of the Water Act,
and § 43 of the Air Act. Id.
112. DIVAN & ROSENCRAZ, supra note 111, at 88@89; Municipal Council,
Ratlam v. ShriVardhichand, (1981) 1 SCR 97.
113. Id. at 123.
114. Article 32 provides: “Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by
this Part [referring to the Fundamental Rights section of the Indian Constitution]. (1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for
the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.” INDIA
CONST. art. 32.
115. Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in
the Supreme Court of India, 4 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 107, 112@15 (1985).
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bly removing the requirement that only persons injured by a fundamental right violation had standing to file a writ of habeas
corpus.116 Starting with Calcutta Gas Co. (Prop.) Ltd. v. State of
W. Bengal,117 the Indian Supreme Court created epistolary jurisdictionO which allows representative standing and citiRen’s
standing under Article 32.118
The Supreme Court, notably Justice P.N. Bhagawati in numerous cases,119 held that on matters of public interest or social
concern, any individual having an interest in the subject-matter
could petition the Court to enforce constitutional rights on behalf
of a large number of personsO “who WwereV poorO ignorantO or in a
socially or economically disadvantaged positionK”120 The key re'uirement was that the letter had to be filed “by or on behalf of
K K K a class of deprived or disadvantaged personsK”121 The Supreme Court reasoned that since Article 32(1) did not explicitly
limit the right to file a writ petition to any specific person or proceeding, it was justified in its interpretation.122 The Court expanded the right to allow public interest litigants to file a writ
petition to enforce a public duty, even absent a specific legal injury to the petitioner.123 The Court strengthened representative
or citizen standing by relaxing procedural requirements as well,
finding that anyone could invoke Article 32 jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court by simply writing a letter to the Court, with the
Court having discretion to treat a letter as a writ petition.124 The
116. DIVAN & ROSENCRAZ, supra note 111, at 134@41.
117. Calcutta Gas Company (Prop.) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962
SC 1044, 1047; DIVAN & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 111, at 127.
118. Id. at 134@41.
119. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 ¶¶ 14, 17, 25; People’s Union
for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1473, 1483; Fertilizer
Corp. v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344 ¶ 23; Nakara v. Union of India, AIR
1983 SC 130 ¶ 64.
120. People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC
1473, 1483.
121. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Shriram 2), (1987) 1 SCR 819, 829.
122. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802 [hereinafter
Bandhua].
123. Fertilizer Corp. v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344, ¶ 23; S.P. Gupta v.
Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149, 194; Clark D. Cunningham, Public Interest
Litigation in Indian Supreme Court: A Study in the Light of American Experience, 29 J. INDIAN L. INST. 494, 99 (1987).
124. Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, Dehra Dun v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 2187, 2195 (India); Bandhua, AIR 1984 SC 802, 848;
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Shriram 2), (1987) 1 SCR 819, 820.
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Indian Supreme Court has also commenced a practice of establishing ad hoc fact-finding committees in deciding PIL cases.125
The Court primarily expanded the rules on locus standi to redress governmental violations of fundamental rights and to enforce accountability of government officials.126
The Indian Supreme Court has also interpreted the Article 21
right to life expansively. Under Article 21, read with Article 13,
laws that “take away or abridge” the right to life and personal
liberty are void.127 Article :< provides thatO “WnVo person shall be
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by the lawK”128 Although Article 21 provides a
negative right?”no person shall be deprived of lifeK K K K”?without specifically using the phrase “right to lifeO” the Indian SuL
preme Court has interpreted Article 21 to include a positive
right to environmental protection.129 The Supreme Court, in reasoning that the right to life should mean more than “mere aniL
mal eSistenceO” and should include the right to live with human
dignity and decency,130 has read into the right to life numerous
other rights, including the right to legal aid, speedy trial, shelter, human dignity, as well as environmental protection.131
The Court has substantiated its decisions to discern a right to
a healthy environment within the Indian Constitution by refer-

125. DIVAN & ROSENCRAZ, supra note 111, at 133@34.
126. Ramsharan v. Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC Supp. 251 ¶ 15.
127. Article 13 of the Indian Constitution provides: “[t]he State shall not
make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part
and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the
contravention, be void.” INDIA CONST. art. 13.
128. INDIA CONST. art. 21.
129. DIVAN & ROSENCRAZ, supra note 111, at 123.
130. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi,
(1981), 2 SCR 516, 528@29 (India). The court observed:
We think that the right to life includes the right to live with
human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the
bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing
and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing
oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and
commingling with fellow human beings.
Id. at 529.
131. See generally DURGA DAS BASU, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 133 (Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee & B.M. Gandhi eds., 8th ed. 2009, reprint 2011) (collecting cases on Article 21 and the rights included in the Article).
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ring to provisions in the Directive Principles of State Policy section of the Constitution, specifically Articles 47 and 48-A, as well
as Article 51-A (g), which provides the fundamental duties of citizens.132 Under Article 51-A (g), citizens have a fundamental
duty to protect the environment.133 Article 47 states that the
state has a primary duty to safeguard public health, while Article 48-A addresses environmental protection specifically and
provides thatO “WtVhe State shall endeavor to protect and improve
the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the
countryK”134 Through its interpretation of Articles 32 and 21, in
conjunction with the directive principles and fundamental duties sections, the Indian Supreme Court has facilitated access to
the judiciary and recognized a constitutional right to environmental protection.
2. Articles 32 and 21 and Environmental Protection
The Indian Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of standing
and the right to life has benefited environmental protection advocates. One of the earliest environmental PIL case is Rural
Litig. and Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun v. State of Uttar Pradesh,135 in which a non-governmental organization initiated a
PIL through a letter to the Indian Supreme Court, documenting
the adverse effects of illegal limestone quarrying in the Mussorrie-Dehradun area.136 The letter alleged a violation of mining
laws by the state of Uttar Pradesh, arguing that illegal mining
caused deforestation and run off to the detriment of villages and
villagers living in the hills, as well as caused hazardous conditions to people and animals in the forest region, resulting from
roads constructed for quarrying operations.137
The Supreme Court accepted the petition and set up an expert
committee to prepare a report for the Court on the issue.138 The
Court’s decision in favor of the petitioners, however, turned an
unenforceable constitutional duty, Article 51-A, which states
that citizens and the Indian government have a fundamental
132. INDIA CONST. arts. 47, 48-A, 51-A(g).
133. INDIA CONST. art. 51-A(g).
134. INDIA CONST. arts. 47 and 48-A.
135. Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, (1987) 1 SCR 641 (India).
136. Id. at 641@42.
137. Id. at 643@52.
138. Id.
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duty to preserve and protect the ecology, into a positive right.139
The Court acknowledged the government’s dual interest in economic development and ecological protection, but found that the
mining operations had long term impacts on both the local residents and the residents in the broader Himalayan region, and
ultimately ordered the government to cease some mining operations.140 Dehradun was a decisive case for invoking Article 32
jurisdiction through the PIL mechanism to address environmental problems.
Public interest litigants have successfully invoked the Supreme Court’s Article 9: =urisdiction to address numerous environmental problems, including pollution of the River Ganga,141
pollution of the Taj Mahal,142 air pollution in the Delhi metropolitan area,143 water pollution from effluents released by tanneries,144 and ecologically detrimental diversion of a river.145 Access
to courts via a PIL action, however, is not unlimited, as courts
will only consider bona fide public interest petitions.146 In Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar,147 a petitioner brought a PIL action, claiming that Tata Iron and Steel Company was releasing
untreated sludge/slurry effluents into the river Bokaro, which
not only created a public health threat but also rendered the water unusable for a variety of purposes, such as drinking and irrigation.148 The petitioner argued that the controlling administrative agency, the State of Bihar Water Pollution Control Board,
had failed to regulate the pollution under the Water Pollution
Act, and that it had permitted several entities to collect the

139. INDIA CONST. art 51-A.
140. Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, supra note 124, at 646E.
141. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCR 530 [hereinafter Ganga Pollution Case], https://indiankanoon.org/doc/59060/.
142. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 393 [hereinafter Taj Case].
143. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1998) 6 SCC 63 (1998) [hereinafter Delhi
Pollution Case].
144. Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 647.
145. M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 SCC 388 (India) [hereinafter
Kamalnath Case].
146. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802.
147. Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 SCR 5 (India) [hereinafter
Subhash Kumar].
148. Id.
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sludge water in exchange for a fee.149 The petitioner sought interim relief from the pollution, as well as an order permitting
the petitioner to collect the sludge. In rejecting the petition, the
Supreme Court held that it would only accept PIL petitions filed
by persons “genuinely interested in the protection of society on
behalf of the community . . . not to satisfy . . . personal grudge
and enmityK”150
While Article 32 of PIL has facilitated it, the key to the creation of a constitutional right to environmental protection in India has been the =udiciary’s expansive interpretation of the Article 21 right to life to include the right to environmental protection in numerous cases. The Article 21 right to life now includes
the right to a clean River Ganga, the right to clean air in the
metropolitan Delhi region, and the right to preserving the Taj
Mahal. Not only has the Supreme Court incorporated environmental protection within the right to life, but it has also ordered
the Indian government to take corrective measures towards enforcing the rights recognized in each case, such as introducing
new emission standards to address air pollution in New Delhi
from mobile sources,151 preparing a plan to clean up the River
Ganga, and relocating tanneries to reduce pollutants threatening the Taj Mahal.152 Even in Subhash Kumar, a case in which
the Supreme Court rejected a PIL petition, the Court reiterated
that Article 21 includes a right to environmental protection and
observed as follows:
Right to life is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and it includes the right of enjoyment of pollution free
water and air for full enjoyment of life. If anything endangers
or impairs that quality of life in derogation of laws, a citizen
has right to have recourse to Article 32 of the Constitution for
removing the pollution of water or air which may be detrimental to the quality of life.153

In recent years, the Indian Supreme Court has included several less traditional environmental problems within Article 21.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1998) 6 SCC 63 [hereinafter Delhi Pollution Case].
152. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 393 [hereinafter Taj Case].
153. Subhash Kumar, 1 SCR at 7.
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In In re Noise Pollution Case,154 the Supreme Court held that
Article :<’s fundamental right included the right to protection
from noise pollution.155 The Court observed that the Article 21
right to protection of life guaranteed the right to live with dignityO including “all the aspects of life which go to make a person’s
life meaningfulO complete and worth livingK”156 The Court also
observed thatO “WaVnyone who wisheWdV to live in peaceO comfort
and quiet within his house had a right to prevent the noise as
pollutant reaching himK”157 After considering noise control legislation in the United Kingdom, the United States, and China, the
Supreme Court issued a series of directions to the pollution control agencies to regulate noise pollution effectively.158
The Indian Supreme Court has also indicated that the right to
environmental protection under Article 21 can be invoked
against private corporations engaged in a state enterprise. In
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India,159 Q“Shriram 2”P the Supreme
Court of India, addressing the question whether the protection
of fundamental rights, from state action under Article 12160
could be enforced against a corporation, observed that corporate
status should not shield an entity from constitutional action for
a violation of fundamental rights when the corporation’s actions
were significantly controlled by the governmentO such as to “viL

154. In this case, petitioner, Mittal, requested that the Supreme Court order
the government to enforce and review noise pollution laws, which prohibited
the use of loud speakers during night hours, except during religious holidays.
In Re Noise Pollution Restricting Use of Loudspeakers, (2005) 1 SCR Supp. 624,
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=27047.
[hereinafter Noise Pollution case]. The petition, triggered by a suicide committed by a thirteen-year-old girl after being raped, alleged that the girl’s pleas
for help were not heard because of the loud noise from the speakers at the time
of the rape. Id. The petitioner argued that failure to enforce noise control laws
resulted in the harm. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCR 819 [hereinafter Shriram
2].
160. Article 12 states, “[i]n this part, unless the context otherwise requires,
the State includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities
within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.”
INDIA CONST. art. 12.
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tally affect public interest,” or when the corporation was essenL
tially an instrumentality or agency of the state.161 Citing to Ajay
Hasia v. Khalid Mujib,162 Justice Bhagawati held that constitutional rights:
[S]hould not be allowed to be emasculated in their application
by a narrow and constricted judicial interpretation. The Courts
should be anxious to enlarge the scope and width of the fundamental rights by bringing within their sweep every authority
which is an instrumentality or agency of the Government or
through the corporate personality of which the Government is
acting, so as to subject the Government in all its myriad activities, whether through natural persons or through corporate
entities to the basic obligation of fundamental rights.163

The Supreme Court also considered whether Shriram industries, the respondent in Shriram 2, was a state under Article 12,
thus subject to judicial scrutiny under Article 32.164 The Court
concluded that because Shriram’s purpose was to promote a particular industry, pursuant to government policy, and it produced
haRardous chlorine gas that could potentially “invade the right
to life of large sections of peopleO” it could be sub=ect to constituL
tional checks and limitations.165 Due to time constraints, however, the Supreme Court did not decide whether the respondent
could be considered a state.166
In Shriram 2, the Supreme Court also signaled that its authority under Article 32 was not limited to issuing directions, orders,
or writs to enforce fundamental rights. It held that the judiciary
has “all incidental and ancillary powers including the power to
forge new remedies and fashion new strategies designed to enforce fundamental rightsK”167 The Court observed that under Article 32, it could award compensation in “appropriate casesO” or
cases where:
161. Shriram 2, 1 SCR at 831, 832. The Court also cited to its decision in
Sukhdev v. Bagatram, holding that “[i]nstitutions engaged in matters of high
public interest or public functions are by virtue of the nature of the functions
performed government agencies. Activities which are too fundamental to the
society are by definition too important not to be considered government functions.” Id. at 834.
162. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, (1981) 2 SCR 79 (India).
163. Shriram 2, 1 SCR at 835@36.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 839.
166. Id. at 839.
167. Id. at 822.
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[I]nfringement of the fundamental right [was] gross and patent, that is, incontrovertible and ex-facie glaring and either
such infringement [was] on a large scale affecting the fundamental rights of a large number of persons, or it should appear
unjust or unduly harsh or oppressing on account of their, poverty or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position to require the person or persons affected by such infringement to initiate and pursue action in the Civil Courts. 168

The Supreme Court did not decide on this matter either, but
its obiters in Shriram 2 are important signals about the judiciary’s willingness to provide relief against environmental harms
under Article 21.169
In Virendra Gaur & Ors v. State of Harayana,170 petitioners
challenged a municipality’s decision to allocate land initially
earmarked to create an open space for recreational use of young
residents under an unimplemented scheme for building a charitable school or Dharmashala, on the ground, among others, that
it violated their constitutional right to environmental protection.171 The Indian Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners
and elucidated the constitutional position on environmental protection.172 Referring to Articles 47, 48-A, and Article 51-A(g), in
conjunction with Article 21, the Court held:
The word 0environment’ is of broad spectrum which brings
within its ambit “hygienic atmosphere and ecological balance.
It is, therefore, not only the duty of the State but also the duty
of every citizen to maintain hygienic environment. The State,
in particular has duty in that behalf and to shed its extravagant unbridled sovereign power and to forge in its policy to
maintain ecological balance and hygienic environment. Article
21 protects right to life as a fundamental right. Enjoyment of
life and its attainment including their right to life with human
dignity encompasses within its ambit, the protection and
preservation of environment, ecological balance free from pollution of air and water, sanitation without which life cannot be
enjoyed. Any contra acts or actions would cause environmental
pollution. Environmental ecological, air, water, pollution, etc.
should be regarded as amounting to violation of Article 21.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 841@42.
170. Virendra Gaur v. State of Harayana, (1994) 6 SCR Supp. 78 (India),
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/27930439/.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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Therefore, hygienic environment is an integral facet of right to
healthy life and it would be impossible to live with human dignity without a humane and healthy environment. Environmental protection, therefore, has now become a matter of grave concern for human existence, [p]romoting environmental protection implies maintenance of the environment as a whole comprising the man-made and the natural environment. Therefore, there is a constitutional imperative on . . . State Government and the municipalities . . . to ensure and safeguard proper
environment. . . .173

State High Courts have also steadily expanded the right to environmental protection under Article 21. In two cases, Mohd.
Salim v. State of Uttarakhand174 & Others and Lalit Miglani v.
State of Uttarakhand,175 the High Court of Uttarakhand (the
“Figh Court”PO eSercising its paren patrie =urisdictionO has conL
ferred juridical status on non-human entities?the rivers Ganga
and Yamuna and the Himalayan ecosystem, including glaciers
and forests?holding that such entities are entitled to protection
under the Indian Constitution.176 In L_] 6.J’Z of India & Ors.
v. Fertilizers and Chems, Travancore,177 the High Court of the
State of Kerala, faced with a PIL case in which petitioners challenged the improper storage of 10,000 tons of ammonia, granted
relief to petitioning residents by directing compliance with pollution control legislation.178 Relying on Article 21, read in con=unction with Article 7<QgPO the court observedO in partO “[w]e are
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. Mohd. Salim v. State of Uttarakhand, Writ Petition (PIL) No. 126 of
2014 [hereinafter Salim] (on file with author).
175. Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand, Writ Petition (PIL) No. 140 of
2015 [hereinafter Miglani] (on file with author).
176. Salim, supra note 174, ¶ 19; Miglani, supra note 175, at 61. The High
Court in Salim held that:
The River Ganga and Yamuna, all their tributaries, streams,
every natural water flowing with flow continuously or intermittently of there rivers, are declared as juristic/legal persons/living entities having the status of a legal person with
all corresponding rights, duties and liabilities of a living person in order to preserve and conserve river Ganga and Yamuna.
Id.
177. Law Society of India v. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travanacore, AIR
1994 (Ker.) 308, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1577991/.
178. Id.
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dealing with a case of environmental pollution, which involves a
larger dimension of a morbid violation of the fundamental right
under Article :< of the Constitution of IndiaK K K K”179 It further
notedO “[d]eprivation of life under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India comprehends certainly deprivations other than total
deprivation. The guarantee of life is certainly more than immunity from annihilation of life. Right to environment is part of the
right to lifeK”180
Through its interpretations of constitutional provisions, the
Indian judiciary has become such an important branch of government in advancing environmental protection that in 2010,
the Indian legislature passed the NGTA to exclusively decide environment-related cases.181 Yet, despite the Indian Court’s =urisL
prudence on Article 21 and environmental protection, the American experience in regard to environmental justice begs the question of whether a right to life is an adequate constitutional protection against environmental harms, or whether the right to life
can also protect against environmental injustice.
B. Environmental Justice: The Missing Constitutional Right in
India
Environmental injustice, understood here as disparate exposure of some communities to environmental harms primarily because of their race or low-income status, is an underexplored issue in India, even though it is prevalent. The Indian Supreme
Court’s eSpansive constitutional =urisprudence remains inadeL
quate because it advances the broader goal of environmental
protection rather than equal environmental protection. The judiciary’s decisions could even inadvertently exacerbate environmental injustice.
1. The Problem of Invisibility of Environmental Justice in
India
There is environmental injustice in India. Consider the disparate protection offered to rural and tribal communities under conservation and land reform laws. There is documentation that
179. Id.
180. Id. As an interesting side note, the Court referred to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in the snail darter case, Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153 (1978), in its decision.
181. See discussion supra Part II.
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during the British rule, forest laws that granted control of forest
resources to the government were detrimental to the social, economic, and cultural needs of certain classes of people, notably
tribal communities and nomad communities belonging to about
200 castes.182 A prominent Indian environmentalist, Anil
Agarwal, noted that:
Government control over forests has definitely meant a reallocation of forest resources away from the needs of local communities and into the hands of urban and industrial India. . . .
India has nearly 200 castes engaged in pastoral nomadism,
which add up to nearly 6 percent of India’s population K K K land
reforms and development programmes, which have promoted
expansion of agriculture to marginal lands, have steadily led to
an erosion of grazing lands. The Rajasthan Canal is a fine example of a government programme that has transformed extensive grazing and into agricultural lands. No effort was made
by the government to ensure that the nomads who used these
grazing lands earlier would benefit from the canal on a priority
basis. In almost every village, the panchayat lands traditionally used as gaucher lands, have been encroached upon by powerful interest groups and privatised. Nomadic groups have
been increasingly impoverished over the last 30 years and an
ever-increasing number is being forced to give up their traditional occupation to become landless labourers or urban migrants.183

Environmentalists in India have argued that conservation
laws in India have impoverished tribal and rural communities
for the benefit of “industrialists and the urban richK”184 As one
scholar notedO “WtVhe proof Wof impoverishmentV is in the fact that
rural poverty and disparity in wealth have increased in actual

182. Anil Agarwal, Politics of Environment-II, in CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND
ENVIRONMENT, THE STATE OF INDIA’S ENVIRONMENT 1984@85: THE SECOND
CITIZEN’S REPORT 362 (Anil Agarwal & Sunita Narain eds., 1986); excerpted in
DIVAN & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 111, at 13@14; for a discussion of the link
between social justice and the environmental movement from the 1970s on,
see, S. Ravi Rajan, A History of Environmental Justice in India, 7 ENVTL. JUST.
117 (2014).
183. Agarwal, supra note 182.
184. Chhatrapati Singh, Common Property and Common Poverty: India’s
Forests, Forest Dwellers and the Law 1 (1986), excerpted in DIVAN &
ROSENCRANZ, supra note 111, at 16@17.
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monetary terms, not merely in terms of the number of poor peopleK”185 The environmental justice issue, in regard to conservation laws, has been mitigated to some extent by conservation
laws that recognize the right of certain indigenous communities
to access forest resources. For example, § 65 of the Indian Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, recognizes traditional hunting rights
of scheduled tribes.186 More notably, the Scheduled Tribes and
Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights
Act) (TRA), passed in 2006, requires forest and wildlife administrators to record rights of all forest-dwellers and establish the
scientific necessity for relocation before displacing forest-dwelling communities to create protected areas under conservation
laws.187 The TRA provides a consent process and guidelines for
resettlement to ensure that all displaced families receive proper
compensation.188 The actual implementation of the TRA mandates, however, does not address the unjust consequences of conservation policies felt by a certain class, tribal, and other forest
dwellers.189 Further, environmental justice concerns, with respect to other environmental problems, are not as well-documented or redressed under the law.
Consider two prominent issues: the Narmada dam project and
the Bhopal gas leak. The Narmada Dam project was conceived
as a solution to water sharing disagreements over the Narmada
185. Id. at 17@18.
186. The Indian Wildlife (Protection) Act, No. 53 of 1972,
http://www.moef.nic.in/sites/default/files/wildlife1l.pdf. This wildlife law is a
conservation law that generally prohibits hunting certain species. Id.
187. The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, No. 2 of 2007, http://www.forests.tn.nic.in/legislations/graphics/The%20Scheduled%20Tribes%20&%20Traditional%20Forest%20Dwellers%20ACt%202006.pdf.
188. Id.
189. Ghazala Shahabuddin & Padmasai Lakshmi Bhamidipati, Conservation-induced Displacement: Recent Perspectives from India, 7 ENVTL. JUST. 122,
128@29 (2014) (documenting the implementation of the TRA and observing
that, apart from the adequacy of the law, the enforcement has failed to implement the law correctly and has perpetuated inequity in the conservation process.); U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INDIA 2014 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 57@58 (2014),
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2014&dlid=236638 (reporting that tribal groups are often uncompensated for their land and not included adequately in the decision-making
process as required under law.); INDIAN INDEP. PEOPLE’S TRIBUNAL, REPORT ON
SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT, CANALS OF INDIRA SAGAR & OMKARWESHWAR AND
JOBAT DAM PROJECT (2010).
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River between the states of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and
Gujarat.190 The benefits from dam construction, mainly to the
State of Gujarat, were energy production and water for irrigation.191 At issue was an inter-state water sharing dispute, to resolve which the Government of India established a tribunal.192
This tribunal established an administrative authority, the Narmada Control Authority, to compulsorily acquire lands that
would be submerged by the dam construction activities and to
rehabilitate dislocated residents, roughly 200,000 persons from
about 40,000 families?a number that varied greatly from the
inception of the process in the 1960s to the dispute settlement
stage in the 1980s.193 The displacement was environmental injustice writ large, with most rural and numerous tribal or Adivasi communities being displaced, primarily for the benefits that
would accrue mainly to urban and industrial communities, and
to some states more than others.194 Under existing land acquisition laws, however, displaced persons who did not own land?
primarily those engaged in non-agricultural activities, such as
fishing, river bed cultivation, and boating, as well as Adivasis,
who did not have a culture of property rights and were essentially considered encroachers under existing law?received no
compensation, nor did families who initially remained undocumented.195 As such, an accurate quantification of all the losses is
nearly impossible.196
190. Philippe Cullet, The Sardar Sarovar Dam Project: An Overview, in THE
SARDAR SAROVAR DAM PROJECT: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 4@7 (Philippe Cullet ed.,
2007); Suyoggothi, The Story of Narmada Bachao Andolan: Human Rights,
ESSENTIAL THINKERS BLOG (Oct. 13, 2013), https://essentialthinkers.wordpress.com/2013/10/13/the-story-of-narmada-bachao-andolan-human-rights/.
191. INDIAN INDEP. PEOPLE’S TRIBUNAL, supra note 189, at 22@23.
192. Inter-State Water Disputes Act, No. 33 of 1956 (India). The Narmada
Water Disputes Tribunal.
193. Cullet, supra note 190, at 20@21; Philippe Cullet, Human Rights and
Displacement: The Indian Supreme Court Decision on Sardar Sarovar in International Perspective, 50 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 973, 974 (2001) [hereinafter Cullet, Human Rights].
194. See generally INDIAN INDEP. PEOPLE’S TRIBUNAL, supra note 189, at 56@
60, 73@75; Cullet, Human Rights, supra note 193, at 973.
195. See generally Cullet, supra note 190, at 21; Komala Ramachandra, 19
Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 275, 276@78 (2006); Thomas R. Berger, The World Bank’s
Independent Review of India’s Sardar Sarovar Projects, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 33, 41@2 (1993).
196. S. JAGADEESAN & M. DINESH KUMAR, THE SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT,
235@56 (2015). Although authors report that the Narmada Dam has promoted
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A report by an independent tribunal comprised of retired Supreme Court judge, Justice A.P. Shah and others, reported as
follows:
Neither land, not livelihood, nor appropriate compensation, nor
house plots, not rehabilitation sites have been ensured to the
PAFs [Project Affected Persons], in full measure, as per their
entitlements. There are also serious concerns of noncompliance
with regard to environmental measures such as the compensatory afforestation, fisheries etc. The MoEF [Ministry of Environment and Forests] Expert Committee had in fact blacklisted
Jobat for vilations in 1995, but there was hardly any monitoring thereafter. Over all these years, MoEF could have, but
failed to monitor effectively, leading NVDA to displace such a
large number of families without rehabilitation affecting their
right to life.197

Strict action, as per law, must be taken against any persecution of the Adivasis or corruption in the R&R [relocation and rehabilitation] process.198
The Bhopal gas leak tragedy occurred in 1984, when methyl
isocyanate leaked from a Union Carbide India Cimited’s QUCICP
pesticide plant and injured/killed roughly 150,000 people, some
suffering chronic injuries ranging from cancer and tuberculosis
to anorexia and depression.199 Not all residents of Bhopal, however, were equally affected. The UCIL plant abutted several
slumsO inhabited by some of the state’s poorest citiRensO even
though other characteristics of the community such as gender or
caste distribution were not well-documented.200 Yet, several victims were not compensated because of their inability to meet the
requirements.

sustainable development in the long run, they acknowledge that the effect of
rehabilitation of displaced persons is harder to quantify, especially given the
fact that there was no effective rehabilitation plan before commencement of
the project. Id.
197. INDIAN INDEP. PEOPLE’S TRIBUNAL, supra note 189, at 17@18.
198. Id.
199. Armin Rosencranz, Shyam Divan & Antony Scott, Legal and Political
Repercussions in India, in LEARNING FROM DISASTER: RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER
BHOPAL 44@64 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 1994); DOMINIQUE LAPIERRE & JAVIER
MORO, FIVE PAST MIDNIGHT IN BHOPAL: THE EPIC STORY OF THE WORLD’S
DEADLIEST INDUSTRIAL DISASTER 55 (2002).
200. See generally Sheila Jasanoff, Introduction: Learning from Disaster, in
LEARNING FROM DISASTER: RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER BHOPAL 1 (Sheila Jasanoff

112

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 43:1

The Indian government passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster
(Processing of Claims) Act of 1985, under which the Indian government was designated as the exclusive legal representative of
the victims.201 The Indian government settled the lawsuit
against Union Carbide for approximately $4 million USD. Several victims, however, remain uncompensated because they
could not provide legal proof of injury or a certification of injury.202 In a country with a large population of illiterate and poor
citizens, requiring any legal documentation without proper support mechanisms, especially given the time lapse is essentially a
denial of a legal remedy.
Even laws passed after the Bhopal gas leak accident failed to
address environmental justice problems. No mechanism was established to identify vulnerable groups or to fairly assess and
redress potential injustice. In 1986, the Indian legislature
passed the first comprehensive environmental legislation, the
Environmental Protection Act Q“EP Act”PO203 which authorizes
the Indian government to regulate activities in the interest of
protecting the environment, as well as coordinating the functions of central and state administrative authorities.204 The central government has promulgated several laws and rules under
the EP Act, authorizing the Union Ministry for Environment
and Forests (MoEF), to regulate polluting industries, to set

ed. 1994) (observing, “[t]he victims of disasters represent, in a sense, the ultimate excluded community from the standpoint of negotiating the design of
technology.”).
201. Id.
202. Marc Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why So Little Has Happened in India After the Bhopal Tragedy, 20 TEX. INT’L L.J. 273, 274 (1985); Rajan, supra note
182, at 119; Jamie Cassels, Outlaws: Multinational Corporations and Catastrophic Law, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 311, 311 (2001); Alan Taylor, Bhopal: The
World’s Worst Industrial Disaster, 30 Years Later, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/12/bhopal-the-worlds-worst-industrial-disaster-30-years-later/100864/; JAMIE CASSELS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE
OF LAW: LESSONS FROM BHOPAL 11@13 (1993).
203. The
Environment
(Protection)
Act,
No.
29
of
1986,
http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/PACT/1986/The%20Environment%20(Protection)%20Act,%201986.pdf.
204. Under Section 3(1) of the EP Act, the Central government can “take all
measures as it deems necessary or expedient for the purpose of protecting and
improving the quality of the environment and preventing, controlling and abating environmental pollution.” See generally DIVAN & ROSENCRANZ, supra note
111, at 66@67.
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standards for managing hazardous wastes, and to establish environmental impact assessment programs.205 Yet, the ineffective
administration of environmental laws has triggered lawsuits to
enforce the laws, without addressing environmental justice issues.206
To be sure, general demographics in India present unique challenges to defining a discrete group in the context of environmental justice. The magnitude of environmental problems obscures
environmental justice issues. It is not, however, impossible to
identify some discrete groups, such as tribal communities and
low-income groups. In India, a significant percentage of people
live below the poverty line?about 22 percent in 2011, even
though India’s per capita income, at about $1600 USD, is much
lower than the U.S. per capita income of $56,000 USD.207 Caste
or class could be another criteria, as certain classes of people are
exposed to wastes on a regular basis, but only certain people
work in hazardous industrial activities and only a certain class
of people are involved in the dangerous activity of dismantling
ships or cleaning sewage.208 As discussed below, legal interven-

205. DIVAN & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 111, at 66@70.
206. Id. at 1@2. The authors note: “[t]he law [in India] works badly, when it
works at all. The legislature is quick to enact laws regulating most aspects of
industrial and development activity, but chary to sanction enforcement budgets or require effective implementation.” Id.
207. GOV’T OF INDIA PLANNING COMM’N, PRESS NOTE ON POVERTY ESTIMATES
2011@12, 3 (2013), http://planningcommission.nic.in/news/press_pov2307.pdf;
World Development Indicators: Table 1.1 Poverty Rates at National Poverty
Lines, WORLD BANK, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.1# (last visited Apr. 28,
2017);
GNI
Per
Capita,
Atlas
Method,
WORLD
BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=IN (last visited Apr. 28, 2017) (indicating that India’s 2015 GNI per capita was $1,590
USD).
208. Samuel D. Permutt, The Manual Scavenging Problem: A Case for The
Supreme Court of India, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 277, 280 (2011); M.N.
Parth, A Dirty, Dangerous Job: Impoverished Dalits Clean Sewers and Dig
Through Waste by Hand Despite a Ban on the Unhealthful Method, L.A. TIMES
(July 4, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-india-sewers20140704-story.html; Priya S. Gupta, Judicial Constructions: Modernity, Economic Liberalization, and the Urban Poor in India, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 25,
54 (2014) (analyzing how slum dwellers are being increasingly “blamed” for
poor environmental conditions.); At Work and At Risk: Cleaning a Manhole for
a Mere Rs 300, INDIAN EXPRESS (June 6, 2016, 5:06 AM), http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/chandigarh/at-work-and-at-risk-cleaning-a-manhole-
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tion has failed to fully redress the injury suffered by such communities. Even a cursory examination of the scope of exclusion
of certain communities from remedies under land reform laws
flag the problem of environmental injustice in India.
2. The Right to Environmental Protection Does Not Address
Environmental Justice Problems
Despite the prevalence of environmental justice problems in
India, legal remedy is limited. PILs were designed to promote
protection of constitutional rights of vulnerable Indians. As the
Supreme Court noted in Sheela Barse v. Union of India & others:
The proceedings in a public interest litigation are, therefore,
intended to vindicate and effectuate the public interest by prevention of violation of the rights, constitutional or statutory, of
sizeable segments of the society, which owing to poverty, ignorance, social and economic disadvantages cannot themselves
assert?and quite often not even aware of?those rights.209

The Indian judiciary has also been sensitive to the effects of its
decision on certain communities. For example, in the Taj case,
the Court’s order to relocate polluting tanneries that were close
to the Taj Mahal included orders to facilitate, relocate, and/or
compensate some workmen who would be affected by the order.210 In the Delhi pollution case, in ordering the government to
take a series of emissions control measures, the Supreme Court
noted the benefits of reduced air pollution to residents at
large.211

for-a-mere-rs-300-manual-scavengers-chandigarh-2836743/; Charlie Campbell, India’s ‘Untouchables’ Are Still Being Forced to Collect Human Waste by
Hand, TIME (Aug. 24, 2014), http://time.com/3172895/dalits-sewage-untouchables-hrs-human-waste-india-caste/. See also Smita Narula, Equal by Law, Unequal by Caste: The “Untouchable” Condition in Critical Race Perspective, 26
WIS. INT’L L.J. 255, 268@70 (2008) (arguing that there is a correlation between
poverty and the caste system in India that results in inequality comparable to
the race-based inequality in the United States.); Raghav Gaiha et al., Has Anything Changed? Deprivation, Disparity, and Discrimination in Rural India,
14 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 113, 117 (2008) (arguing that the link between poverty and caste persists in India).
209. Sheela Barse v. Union of India (1988) 2 SCC 226.
210. Taj Case, supra note 152. The Court ordered the displaced industries to
either re-hire existing workers or, when workers chose not to relocate, then to
pay them compensation. Id.
211. Delhi Pollution Case, supra note 151.
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In several other cases, PIL has directly or indirectly addressed
problems of India’s vulnerable communitiesK Hor eSampleO the
Supreme Court’s order to relocate industries polluting the
Ganga river aimed at cleaning up the river for Indians across
the board,212 in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (child labor case),
the Supreme Court’s order to protect the rights of children in
hazardous industries, and in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal
Action v. Union of India & Others,213 the Court’s order to enforce
the Indian Coastal Zone Management Act, which protected the
livelihood of the fishing community, as well as the local ecology.214 There can be little doubt that in some of its decisions, the
Indian Supreme Court, through the PIL process, protected the
rights of vulnerable Indian communities.
There remains, however, a serious concern whether PIL has
become diluted,215 and whether the Supreme Court can ensure
equal environmental protection under Article 14 of the Indian
Constitution.216 Consider Almitra Patel and Anr. v. Union of India and Others.217 In Almitra, Ms. Patel petitioned the Indian
Supreme Court to intervene in the problem of sewage and waste
management in New Delhi.218 In addressing the issue, the Indian Supreme Court not only condemned poor administrative action by the pollution control boards but also the municipalities
for allowing slums to grow and the slum dwellers for causing
hygiene problems.219 The Court ordered the Delhi municipality

212. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCR 530, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/59060/ [hereinafter Ganga Pollution Case].
213. Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC
1446.
214. Id.
215. Surya Deva, Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review, 28
CIV. JUST. Q. 19, 35@40. (2009).
216. Article 14 of the Indian Constitution states, “[e]quality before law: The
State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection
of the laws within the territory of India.” INDIA CONST. art. 14. Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.
INDIA CONST. art. 15.
217. Almitra H. Patel v. Union of India, (1998) 2 SCC 416 [hereinafter Almitra]. Following the initial decision, the NGT has issued a series of orders to
the MoEF to file progress reports on waste management in India. Id. The information is available at http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/category/44413/thesaurus/almitra-h-patel-others/.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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authorities to clean up and eventually clear the slums.220 While
the case reaffirms the Indian =udiciary’s commitment to promotL
ing environmental protection through PILO the Court’s focus on
slum dwellers as contributors to the problem, as opposed to other
communities of people, demonstrates inattention to potential environmental justice concerns as well.
The Virendra Gaur case221 is another example that the Supreme Court could focus on the environmental protection aspects of a PIL, to the exclusion of equal protection implications.
In Virendra Gaur, the petitioners challenged the allocation of
disputed land for a charitable building construction.222 The
Court held that even though the law in question permitted use
of the space allocated for other compelling public use, such a purpose was not established in the case.223 While the Court’s finding
of absence of a compelling public purpose exception appears reasonable in light of the facts, especially that the municipality had
ac'uired land from residents for such useO the Court’s overL
whelming engagement with the constitutional right to environment, combined with its non-engagement with balancing different competing interests, is a sign that equal protection or concerns for certain vulnerable communities could become secondary to the right to environmental protection.
Moreover, the larger concern in the environmental justice context is one of equal protection of environmental laws. Providing
access to the judiciary, while critically important, will not ensure
equal protection. Even in cases like the Shriram case, where the
Supreme Court recognized the impact of relocation on workers,
considering the impact on communities affected by a decision, or
ordering the government to install pollution control measures
does not mean that all communities will benefit from environmental protection clauses. For example, in G. Sundarajjan v.
Union of India & Others [hereinafter Kudankulam nuclear
power plant],224 petitioner filed a PIL, challenging the Indian
government’s decision to locate a nuclear power plant along the
coast line of a village, Kudankulam, on several grounds, including safety concerns from radiation and nuclear waste disposal,

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 4.
Virendra Gaur v. State of Harayana, (1994), 6 SCR Supp. 78 (India).
Id.
Id.
G. Sundarrajan v. Union of India, (2013) Civil Appeal No. 4440 (India).
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threat to marine life and biodiversity, and violation of environmental impact laws, particularly that a new environmental impact assessment was re'uired following India’s conclusion of an
agreement with Russia after environmental clearance was issued.225 Although the Supreme Court of India, in reviewing the
matter, reiterated its jurisprudence on environmental protection
under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, it decided that locating the nuclear power plant at that spot would not violate Article 21.226 The Court held that:
While balancing the benefit in establishing . . . [the nuclear
power plant], with the right to life and property and the protection of environment including marine life, we have to strike
a balance, since the production of nuclear energy is of extreme
importance for the economic growth of our country, alleviate
poverty, generate employment etc. While setting up a project
of this nature, we have to have an overall view of larger public
interest rather than smaller violation of right to life guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution.227

The Supreme Court’s reasoningO putting the larger public inL
terest above an Article 21 violation, speaks volumes about the
treatment given by the Court to environmental justice and Article 21. Undeniably, siting decisions, and environmental protection policies generally require a careful balancing, with nuclear
power often being viewed as an answer to India’s dire energy
infrastructure and a pawn in reducing India’s povertyK The
larger question, however, is whether such balancing can be read
as a carte blanche for allowing violations of Article 14. The Kudankulam nuclear power plant case implies just that, thus highlighting the absence of environmental justice considerations
even in the PIL process. The Supreme Court’s approach in the
Kudankulam nuclear power plant case addressing the tension

225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. ¶ 175 (emphasis added). In allowing the construction of the nuclear
plant to proceed, the Court reasoned that the problem was one faced by all
countries, such as Britain, the United States, and Canada, all of which had
favored development policies. Id. The Court dismissed the petition, even after
recognizing that the hot water released would exceed what was permitted under existing rules, that Russia would not accept spent nuclear fuel, and that
the government had not yet devised a plan for permanent disposal of nuclear
waste. Id.
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between environmental protection and social justice228 raises the
question what a constitutional right to environmental protection
entails.
III. THE “RIGHT” RIGHT TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
The U.S. and Indian experiences discussed above illustrate
that a right to environmental protection matters, not only to protect the environment, but also to prevent violations of constitutionally guaranteed rights. Recognition of a right to environmental protection, as a concomitant of constitutional rights, is essential to preserve some fundamental norms of a society.229 Moreover, the experiences in the two jurisdictions can help construct
what a right to environmental protection entails. A right to environmental protection should reflect, or, if it is read in existing
constitutional rights, be informed by, at least three other rights,
namely, 1) the right to life, 2) the right to equal protection under
environmental laws, and 3) the right to judicial remedy. Each
right is normatively and practically important and is considered
separately below.
A. The Right to Life and Environmental Protection
The expansion of the right to life to include a healthy environment or other components is normatively intuitive, as evidenced
by the interpretation of constitutional provisions in different jurisdictions. Several countries now recognize a healthy environment as integral to the right to life. Remarkably, the Indian judiciary, which is credited for its innovative interpretation of the
constitutional right to life to include a healthy environment,
drew inspiration from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Munn v. People of Illinois.230 The Court observed:
By the term 0lifeO’ as here usedO something more is meant than
mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation
extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed.
The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body by
228. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Pro-Human Rights, but Anti-poor? A Critical
Evaluation of the Indian Supreme Court From a Social Movement Perspective,
8 HUM. RTS. REV. 157 (2007); Rajan, supra note 182, at 117.
229. See S.P. Sathe, Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience, 6 J. L. & POL’Y
29, 60 (2001).
230. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). See also Normawati Binti Hashim,
Constitutional Recognition of the Right to Healthy Environment: The Way Forward, 105 PROCEDIA?SOC.& BEHAV. SCI. 204 (2013).
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the amputation of an arm or leg, or the putting out of an eye,
or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which
the soul communicates with the outer world. The deprivation
not only of life, but of whatever God has given to everyone with
life, for its growth and enjoyment, is prohibited . . . if its efficacy
be not frittered away by judicial decision.231

The Indian Supreme Court echoed the Munn decision in Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh,232 later expanding the philosophy of this interpretation in other cases to include the right
against pollution by tanneries and pollution affecting the Taj
Mahal.233 This normative approach is important not only because it brings environmental protection outside the exclusive
realm of the legislature and the executive but also because,
through the operation of stare decisis, decisions recognizing a
right to environmental protection, binds an entire judicial system to interpret violations of rights due to environmental pollution from the lens of a fundamental right to life. In India, for
eSampleO Figh Courts have followed the Supreme Court’s interL
pretation and recognized the right to environmental protection
as part of the right to life.234
The right to life in India, like in the United States, cannot be
deprived without due process of law,235 which, in the context of
fundamental rights, includes substantive due process.236 An interpretation of the right to life, as inclusive of a right to environmental protection, would strengthen environmental protection
in several ways. For example, in the United States, a violation
of the right to environmental protection, as interpreted under
Article 21, would be subject to heightened scrutiny, and only
narrowly tailored infringement would be deemed constitutional.
231. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, at 142.
232. Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295 (India).
233. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 393.
234. For a discussion of the permeation of constitutional environmental
rights and norms into High Courts, see Raghav Sharma, Note, Green Courts in
India: Strengthening Environmental Governance?, 4 L. ENV’T & DEV. J. 52, 69@
70 (2008).
235. The language of Article 21 and Article 14 of the Indian and U.S. Constitutions, respectively, provide that “[n]o person shall be deprived of their right
to life . . . except by due process of law.” INDIA CONST. art. 21; U.S. CONST art.
14.
236. Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause,
120 YALE L.J. 408, 427 (2010). For a discussion of “procedure established by
law,” in India, see DAS BASU, supra note 131, at 134@35.
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Environmental protection, as a concomitant of the right to life,
would strengthen the normative framework for environmental
protection, reduce arbitrariness in decision-making, and provide
a concrete foundation for enacting laws to protect the environment. Even though environmental laws in the United States are
relatively robust, recent efforts by environmental plaintiffs to
establish that the U.S. government has a constitutional duty to
protect American youth from climate change under the public
trust doctrine flags the gap in the existing legal structure and
signals the importance of incorporating environmental protection into constitutional rights.237
Recognizing a right to environmental protection, as a subset of
the negative right to life, could also provide American environmental justice advocates with an alternative to the Equal Protection Clause. Environmental justice advocates, facing the
nearly insurmountable test of proving intentional discrimination under the current judicial standard to qualify for protection
under the Equal Protection Clause, could seek redress, under an
alternative constitutional provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process Clause.238 The Due Process Clause proscribes states from depriving “any person of lifeO liberty or propertyO without due process of lawK”239 While this article does not
explore this idea fully,240 arguably environmental justice advocates could claim that environmental laws with siting procedures that place high burden of environmental harm impinge on
the procedural due process guarantee in relation to life, liberty
or property. Of course, such an argument would be limited by
the Court’s cautious approach to the Hourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, but may be worth exploring.241 Treating environmental protection on par with a negative constitutional
right to life, liberty or property can thus be normatively and

237. Mary Christina Wood & Charles W. Woodward, IV, Atmospheric Trust
Litigation and the Constitutional Right to a Healthy Climate System: Judicial
Recognition at Last, 6 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 634, 675@78 (2016). See discussions infra Section III.C.
238. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
239. Id.
240. The author will be discussing this issue in a separate article.
241. For a general discussion of the scope of the Due Process Clause, see Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044,
1110@14 (1984); 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §17.2 (5th ed. 2012).
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practically significant. The normative attraction to reading environmental protection as a part of a fundamental right to life
can be evidenced in the number of countries that have followed
a similar approach, from Nigeria and other African nations, to
countries in Asia and Latin America.242 Also, several constitutions, including those of South Africa, Costa Rica, Hawaii, and
Massachusetts,243 specifically confer a separate right to a clean
environment.244 This demonstrates that reading an environmental protection into the right to life is not inconceivable.
B. The Right to Equality
Even the creation of a specific right to environmental protection may not imply a right to equal environmental protection.
Consider Article XI of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii,
which states thatO “WeVach person has the right to clean and
healthful environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental quality including control of pollution and conservation,
protection and enhancement of natural resources. Any person
may enforce this right against any party, public or private,
through appropriate legal proceedings.”245 The Constitution of
South Africa has a similar provision and states as follows:
Every person has the right (a) to an environment that is not
harmful to their health or well-being; and (b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; (ii) promote

242. For a discussion on all the countries that have adopted the right to environment as part of a right to life, see Kaniye S.A. Ebeku, Constitutional Right
to a Healthy Environment and Human Rights Approaches to Environmental
Protection in Nigeria: Gbemre v. Shell Revisited, 16 REV. EUR., COMP, & INT’L
ENVTL. L. 312, 312@15 (2007).
243. For a comprehensive discussion on state constitutions that provide a
right to clean environment, see NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON, ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION OF REAL PROPERTY § 3.07 (2017).
244. S. AFR. CONST. sec. 24 (1996); COSTA RICA CONST. art. 50, amended by
Law No. 7412 art. 1, June 3, 1994; HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9; MASS. CONST. art.
XCVII. For a comprehensive list and discussion of countries and U.S. states
that provide/recognize a constitutional right to environmental protection, see
also Ebeku, supra note 242; Brandl & Bungert, supra note 1.
245. HAW. CONST. art. XI.
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conservation and; (iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable
economic and social development.246

The language in most other constitutions is similar, with none
specifically mentioning the issue of equal protection.247 Yet, as
the American experience with environmental justice demonstrates, equal protection under environmental laws is a distinct
issue that is not automatically addressed by passing environmental laws. The Indian judicial experience, despite the Supreme Court explicitly interpreting Article 21 to include a right
to environmental protection with a view to advance social justice, does not guarantee equal protection. Yet, equal protection
is a fundamental constitutional right and its violation, by denial
of equal environmental protection under laws is just that, a violation of a fundamental constitutional right. A right to environmental protection is meaningful only when such a right is
equally distributed in any society.
The actual realization of equal protection of environmental
laws, however, is an onerous challenge. The American experience with environmental justice, specifically the difficulty in
proving intent or purposeful discrimination, is an important
predicator. The Indian experience in proving that an environmental law violates the constitutional right to equality will
likely be similar. Article 14 of the Indian Constitution mirrors
the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.248 Article
15 of the Indian Constitution is comparable to Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act, § 601, in that it prohibits discrimination solely
on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex, and place of birth, but
does not include income-based discrimination.249 Similar to § 602
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, the Indian Supreme Court has
interpreted Article 15 to include state actions that are facially
neutral, but have a discriminatory impact.250 There are, however, some differences. The Indian courts have not explicitly
246. S. AFR. CONST. sec. 24 (1996).
247. For a sampling of various constitutional law texts, see Ebeku, supra note
242.
248. INDIA CONST. art. 14; U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
249. INDIA CONST. art. 15(1).
250. DAS BASU, supra note 131, at 65 (citing to State of Bombay v. Bombay
Education Society, (1955) SCR 568, a case in which the Court held that a law
limiting admission to English schools to students whose spoken language was
English violated the Constitution (then Article 29), because the law would, in
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read into either Article 14 or 15 an intent requirement.251 Thus,
the prevalence of PIL, combined with the explicit prohibition of
certain types of discrimination within the Indian Constitution,
alleviate challenges such as the limits to bringing a private
cause of action under § 602 of Title VI that prevail in the American environmental justice jurisprudence. The Indian judiciary
has also held that procedural laws can violate equal protection
guaranteed under Article 14, meaning that all citizens have
equal procedural rights.252 Reading this interpretation of Article
14 with the prohibition of discriminatory impact under Article
15, an environmental justice plaintiff in India could arguably
challenge discriminatory permitting procedures. More broadly,
the Indian Supreme Court has recognized that principles of natural justice should apply to administrative orders.253
The actual application of Article 14 or Article 15 to environmental protection matters in India will likely be as cumbersome
as it has been in the United States. For example, few cases have
been brought under Article 15, primarily because petitioners
must prove that the discrimination was “only” on the grounds of
race, religion, or caste.254 The task of proving that a law was
passed, or a state action taken, only to discriminate is tantamount to requiring intent under the Equal Protection Clause.
The Indian Supreme Court has also held that a challenge to the
administration of a law under Article 14 would fail, unless the
plaintiff proved that an administrative official or body acted intentionally to injure the plaintiff.255
Even if one were to overcome specific doctrinal constraints and
proceed to the merits of a claim before a judiciary, there still remains the question of actual implementation. What courts can
do to redress inequality has vexed the judiciaries, both in the
United States and in India. In both jurisdictions, the judiciary

effect, limit admission to non-Asiatic students and discriminate on religious
grounds).
251. Id. at 41. While the author notes that intentional discrimination by an
administrative agent enforcing a non-discriminatory law is untenable, there is
no requirement that a legislation was passed with the intent to discriminate.
252. Lachmandas v. State of Bombay, 1952 SCR 710, 726 (India); DAS BASU,
supra note 131, at 37.
253. DAS BASU, supra note 131, at 45.
254. Id. at 65.
255. Irani v. State of Madras, (1962) 2 SCR 169 (India).
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has introduced forms of affirmative action to redress the problem of unequal opportunity, and in both jurisdictions, the remedy remains controversial.256 For example, as in the United
States, the Indian Supreme Court has interpreted Article 14 to
allow reasonable classification. Keeping in mind the objective of
a statute, the Court has approved of classifications for geographical and historical reasons.257 The Court has also held that there
is a presumption of reasonable classification and constitutionality of a law, which can be rebutted by showing discriminatory
impact in its implementation.258
In India, unequal treatment alone is not a violation of Article
14, unless the discrimination is unreasonable. According to the
Supreme CourtO “if Cegislature takes care to reasonably classify
persons for legislative purposes and if it deals equally with all
persons belonging to a well-defined class, it is not open to the
charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that the law
does not apply to other persons%” ratherO the discrimination must
be unreasonable.259 Given the similar interpretative approaches
taken by the Indian and American judiciary with respect to the
constitutional right to equal protection, such as recognition of
reasonable classification of a law, claiming a constitutional right
to equal protection under the Indian Constitution may well resemble the American experience.
The difficulty in penetrating Article 14 to seek equal environmental protection does not imply the absence of an inequality
problem with respect to environmental protection. It is not a reason to exclude equal protection from a right to environmental
protection. The fact that some communities around the world
face disparate environmental impacts is a testimony to the failure of governmental institutions to deliver on the promise of
equal protection under the Constitution. It also raises questions
of whether the right to environmental protection can be achieved

256. For a broad discussion of the constitutional right to equal protection, see
Nicole Lillibridge, The Promise of Equality: A Comparative Analysis of the Constitutional Guarantees of Equality in India and the United States, 13 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1301 (2005).
257. DAS BASU, supra note 131, at 36; Mohanlal v. Man Sing, AIR 1962 SC
73 (India); Bhaiyalal v. State of M.P., AIR 1962 SC 981 (India).
258. DAS BASU, supra note 131, at 34@35.
259. Id. at 35@36.
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without equal protection, and if so, how the judiciary should reconceive current doctrinal interpretation to address the problem.
C. The Right to Access to Courts
In the United States and India, both common law systems, the
judiciary has been pivotal in upholding the constitutional validity of environmental protection?the United States through the
Commerce Clause and India through the recognition of an Article 21 right to environmental protection.260 In the context of a
right to environmental protection, however, both the Indian and
the American experiences highlight the continuing importance
of the right to judicial review. In India, PIL, which was founded
on a vision of delivering social justice, demonstrates the significant difference that judicial intervention can make in addressing
problems that the legislative and executive branches of the government have not addressed effectively. Add to that the creation
of the NGT, which proves the perceived efficacy of the judiciary,
both in the eyes of the public and the legislature. The resulting
vision is that access to courts is a critical component of the right
to environmental protection. Several other countries have a similar experience, where courts have recognized a constitutional
right to environmental protection and/or where special environmental courts have been established.261
For the most part, the U.S. experience is no different in terms
of the role of the judiciary and the importance of constitutional
doctrines to pursue remedies against environmental harms. The
most notable current example is the case of Juliana v. United
States.262 In Juliana, environmental plaintiffs, who included
youth aged 8@19, argued that President Obama and other executive agencies violated their substantive due process rights to
life, liberty, and property, as well as their constitutional obliga-

260. See supra INTRODUCTION.
261. For example, Australia and New Zealand have established special environmental law courts. Sharma, supra note 234, at 60@62.
262. Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15CV01517(TC), 2016 WL 6661146 (D.
Or. Nov. 10, 2016). Proceedings in this case are ongoing. For a comprehensive
overview of all relevant proceedings and related judicial actions, see
http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2016/20161110_docket-615-cv-1517_opinionand-order-1.pdf.
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tion to hold certain natural resources in trust for the people under the public trust doctrine.263 Although the matter has not proceeded on its merits, the District Court of Oregon did not dismiss
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.264 The case is currently pending on appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but even if the plaintiffs lose on appealO the case leaves no doubt of the =udiciary’s pivotal role in
protecting the right to environmental protection, especially
when contentious issues have not been adequately addressed by
the other branches of the government.265 The U.S. Supreme
Court’s eStension of standing to UKSK states in Massachussets v.
EPA266 is another facet of the importance of access to courts. Recognizing that states have standing to bring an action was critical
to this climate change litigation, which sought EPA action to reduce emissions from automobiles.267
The American experience, with respect to environmental justice, also highlights the importance of access to judicial review
in a different wayK The Supreme Court’s decision in Sandoval is
an example of this. The U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of
§ 602 of Title VI to exclude private actions, especially when considered in light of the impediment of proving intent to succeed
in an action under the Equal Protection Clause and § 601 of Title
VI, has largely foreclosed judicial redress against environmental
injustice. Absent appropriate legislative measures to safeguard
against unequal protection under environmental laws, this situation, faced by environmental justice plaintiffs, implies that a
right to environmental protection cannot be fully realized without access to the judiciary. Of course, the right to judicial review
does not imply a right for environmental plaintiffs to win every
single case. In the Indian example, for instance, the outcome in
263. Juliana, 2016 WL 6661146, at *1. For a full discussion on the lawsuit,
see Wood & Woodward, supra note 237.
264. Id.
265. Climate change litigation is another example. See, e.g., Michael C.
Blumm & Mary C. Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954661; David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical
Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business
as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15, 76@77 (2012); Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate
Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L
L. 585, 603@14 (2009).
266. 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007).
267. Id. at 504.
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cases involving the Narmada dam or the Kudankulam nuclear
power plant may have been exactly the same if the Court had
considered the issue from the lens of a constitutional right to
equal protection. Yet, the judiciary can, and has, filled many a
legal void. A right to fair judicial access should, therefore, be an
integral and indispensable part of the right to environmental
protection.
CONCLUSION
In most modern legal systems of the world, rights, with all the
complexities integral to the concept, are steps towards realizing
justice. Rights are inherently problematic, most particularly individual rightsK The realiRation of one person’s rights may inL
fringe on another person’s rightsK The right to develop one’s
property may interfere with the right of another to preserve air
quality. The right to have a clean environment may interfere
with the same right of another, after all the waste needs to be
dumped some place, and the entire planet is not yet a desert.
These complex problems cannot be solved by eliminating rights,
but instead by balancing competing rights through legal doctrines. In countries like the United States and India, the mechanisms for addressing competing interests is located in the Constitution. Through doctrinal principles and norms, as well as the
distribution of power among the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches, the Constitution of these two countries institutionalizes rights. When faced with environmental harms, without effective legislative intervention, their citizens have turned
to the Constitutions to vindicate rights they perceived were violated by state action or inaction.
In the case of India, state failure to address environmental
problems caused such severe harm, especially in some cases,
that the Indian Supreme Court carved out a right to a healthy
environment as part of a fundamental constitutional right to life.
How could Indians fully realize their right to life without clean
air or water? In the United States, citizens turned to the Constitution as well. With relatively robust environmental laws, however, the redress that environmental plaintiffs sought under the
American Constitution was not through the right to life, which
would likely only promote better environmental laws. American
environmental justice advocates sought equal protection to environmental laws, a right not to be discriminated against or
treated differently from other Americans. Unlike the Indian
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courtsO howeverO the American =udiciary’s =urisprudence on the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring plaintiffs to prove intentional or purposeful discrimination,
has not only effectively foreclosed a constitutional remedy to environmental justice plaintiffs, but it has also almost eliminated
a private remedy against unequal protection of environmental
laws. This interpretation has also trickled down to statutory
equal protection provisions under § 601 of the Civil Rights Act.
The =udiciary’s interpretation of & 6I: of the Civil Rights ActO
rejecting a private cause of action, has precluded an alternative
venue for seeking remedies. Moreover, upon a closer look, even
the Indian Supreme Court’s pioneering =urisprudence on public
interest litigation, which seeks to provide judicial access to the
country’s poorest and most vulnerable citizens and promote social justice, is not immune from environmental justice concerns.
The Indian Supreme Court has, in some cases, favored the larger
interest of the public over the violation of constitutional rights
of some communities or discrete groups, without examining the
issue from the perspective of the constitutional right to equal
protection.
These two comparative experiences in the United States and
India compel one overarching conclusion: for those outside the
reaches of environmental protection legislation, environmental
harm is a threat to their rights, the traditional protection of
which in modern constitutional societies is found in the Constitution. Whether it is articulated as a threat to the right to life or
to equal protection, citizens view environmental harm as an infringement of their existing constitutional rights. The experience in the two common law systems demonstrates that when
one claims a right to environmental protection, it is not merely
a right to protect the environment. It is also a right to protect
the environment in a manner that equally benefits all citizens,
and more importantly, that does not discriminate among citizens
when allocating environmental burdens. This task cannot be accomplished by any single branch of government. The environmental justice movement in the United States and the
PIL/constitutional jurisprudence in India demonstrate that the
judiciary is indispensable to realizing constitutional rights.
Thus, not only should a right to environmental protection be recognized, but the right to environmental protection should also
reflect and promote, at least, three integral rights: 1) the right

2017]

The "Right" Right to Environmental Protection

129

to life, 2) the right to equal protection of the laws, and 3) the
right to judicial review.
The articulation of a right to environmental protection, with
all three components integrated, however, does not have to take
any particular form. A country can enact legislation articulating
these rights or amend the Constitution to include a right to environmental protection and specify what such a right would entail, so long as the right to environmental protection is realized.
Whatever the form, acknowledging a right to environmental protection serves some important functions. One, if we accept that
a system of rights is integral to a constitutional form of governance, then a right to environmental protection cannot legitimately be excluded from such a system, and thus, any legal action should be guided by the fact that environmental protection
laws serve an important purpose, that of upholding and/or preventing the violation of the Constitution. Two, existing constitutional rights cannot be fully realized if they are not applied to
environmental protection as well. Passing laws to address environmental problems will not by itself guarantee the protection
of all constitutional rights, as some constitutional rights, such
as the right against the denial of equal protection, may require
more than passing environmental laws. Three, on constitutional
interpretation, the judiciary is the final arbiter. Thus, unless citizens have access to courts and to a fair opportunity to have their
problems considered on their merits, the right to environmental
protection, with all of its constitutional implications, cannot be
fully realiRedK The “right” right to environmental protection is
more than a mere right to environmental protection, it includes
the right to life, the right to equal protection, and the right to
judicial access.

